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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to formulate some hypotheses concerning the
organisation of language processing by human and computer. The ideas
advocated here are not yet developed enough to warrant a detailed
presentation. The author has decided to present them to the
scientific community despite the early stage of the inquiry because
of their possible impact, especially for the investigations of the
up-to-now completely mysterious fact that English articles are
rendered in Slavonic languages mainly by word order and vice versa;
explaining the phenomenon, viewed by the author as different ways of
controlling the depth of nominal phrase processing, would serve both
to improve our understanding of the nature of language and assist the
design of reliable machine translation systems. The paper is
intended to be selfcontained, but familiarity with the work of Norman
and Bobrow (1975,1976,1979, Bobrow and Norman 1975) is strongly
recommended. I would like also to comment briefly on the relation of
the present paper to the multiple environments model of natural
language, formulated first in (Bien 1975).
The basic assumption of the multiple environments approach is that if
a computer system is to understand natural language fully, it must be
a sufficiently adequate model of the relevant cognitive processes of
human beings. Therefore it is not enough to work out separately the
problems of language understanding (e.g. pronoun resolution); the
solutions should be integrated into a proper overall structure. In
the first phase of my research (Bien 1976, 1976a) my attention was
concentrated on modelling by means of "environments" the division of
memory into different ontological classes (e.g. addressee's beliefs,
the addressee's beliefs about the sender's beliefs about the
addressee, etc.). A similar approach was advocated independently by
Cohen (1978) and used successfully by his colleagues (Perrault,
Allen, Cohen, 1978). Although the notion of environments and its
equivalents proved useful, its psychological reality remains still an
open question (Bien 1977, Wilks and Bien 1979).
The multiple environments model was presented using «utterances as
programs» metaphor (Davies and Isard 1972, Longuet-Higgins 1972),
which made it rather hard to understand for readers without a
computer science background. On the other hand, the metaphor served
different (although not contradictory) purposes than e.g. in (Miller,
Johnson-Laird 1976). Instead of looking for the analogues of
compilation and execution, I insisted that the language processor
does not make any decision of his own, just as a computer hardware or
software interpreter executes step by step its current program. In
consequence, I claimed that the processor can process properly only
an utterance formulated according to some specific "minimaI effort
principles" (Bien 1977). The principles allow the sender to encode
(usually subconsciously) in the structure of the utterance some
control information for the language processor of the addressee. In
the present paper we will see what such control information might
look like.
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For some readers the following example may serve as an illustration
of the approach advocated here. The human cognitive processor has
some intrinsic limitations, just as the size of relevant registers
limits the precision of floating point arithmetic. A typical compiler
generates the binary code in a straightforward fashion, usually
preserving the source code order of operations; therefore we can
specify the operations on the source code level in such an order as
to prefer e.g. adding numbers of simi1ar sizes (which results in
minimization of the round-off errors introduced by the normalisation
of the components). In other words, we do have a way of controlling
the precision of floating point arithmetic although at first glance
it seems uncontrollable. Just as the order of components to be added
should fit the implicit rules of the computer system used. the
utterance, to be properly understood. must be adapted to the relevant
features of the human language processor.
The limits of the paper do not permit a fulI discussion of the pros
and cons for the opinions presented; in particular. it is not
possible to give proper credit to alI the works which, influencing my
way of thinking about language. have led me more or less directly to
the formulation of the "resource control hypothesis".
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2. BASIC FEATURES OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESSQR
We assume that the processor's behaviour is determined first of alI
by two properties formulated by Bobrow and Norman (1975):
"There is a limit to the processing resources available to the
organism" (p. 140)
which states the resource limit principle. It is very useful to
explain the interaction between various mental processes, classified
as resource-limited (when an increase in the amount of processing
resources results in improved performance) or data-limited (when
performance is independent of processing resources). The second
property, called here the input assimilation principle and originally
formulated as "alI data are to be accounted for" (p. 140), states
that for alI sensory data "some conceptual scheme must be found for
which these data are appropriate" (p. 144). In other words, the
cognitive processor permanently monitors the perceived information
and attempts to fit it into its expectations.
We assume also two other principles "steady availability of
resources" and "steady consumption of resources". The processing
power of the processor changes relatively slowly and in rather narrow
bounds, being probably a function of the organism arousal; on the
other hand, the processor is never idle. Whenever the processing of
the external data (which has the highest priority because of the
input assimilation principle) doesn't require alI the resources, the
available power is used for some spontaneous action of the processor.
We assume that such a spontaneous action consists almost exclusively
in resource-limited processes like memory search or infer.ences.
We take for granted that processing is performed in paralle!. In
consequence, we imagine the cogn1t1ve processor as a network of
numerous microprocessors; the pseudo-physical properties of the
network constitute an intrinsic part of the model of the cognitive
system to be advocated here. According to our belief that the
processor doesn't take any sophisticated decisions of its own, we
assume that the microprocessors are supervised according to some very
simple principle. Its first approximation may be e.g. the following
rule if a computation branches into n alternatives, demand n
microprocessors; if they are not available, suspend the computation.
A process, even a suspended one, may receive partial output from
other related processes. Therefore the computation is resumed either
because the required number of microprocessors become available, or
because the output received caused the computation to reduce its
demand.
On the other hand, it may happen that two processes request the same
particular microprocessor; it seems natural to prefer the process
which is more straightforward, i.e. involves less alternative
computations and, in consequence, demands fewer microprocessors. In
what follows we will calI such processes more deterministic, so this
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allocation rule can be stated as the preference for determin,isti$
computation rule. The rule, in turn, can be viewed as a new kind of
minimai effort principle, because the statement "deterministic
processes are easier to compute" is intuitively true.
We expect that the total number of demands always exceeds the
resources available; the problem of deadlock doesn't exist here,
because it is intuitively acceptable that some demands of the lowest
priority may never be satisfied.
Because of the large number of microprocessors, it would be unnatural
to expect that every microprocessor communicates equally easily with
alI others. On the contrary, it seems that a microprocessor should
communicate directly only with its neighbours in the network, and the
messages to other microprocessors must be transmitted indirectly. In
consequence, the flow of computation may often depend on the timing
of input/output messages, determined by the pseudo-physical
configuration of micro-processors running the interacting processes
under consideration.
The strict definition of the processor advocated here is a very
difficult task. A promising direction of research may be «augmented
logic programming» , i.e. logic programming (Kowalski 1979) which
provides simplicity, paralielism, continuous output of partial
results and other interesting features, supplemented by some
structuralisation in the style of actors (Hewitt, Bishop and Steiger
1973) with the control strategy proposed above; some valuable
suggestions may be perhaps also supplied by neurophysiology. It would
be interesting, for example, to investigate the cerebral blood flow
to verify whether the oxygen supply might be the primary factor
limiting the processing power.
It should be noted that in the above discussion we have in mind
exclusively subconscious processes. Contrary to Bobrow and'Norman, I
have no strong intuitions about the purpose of consciousness. For
example, the "processing symmetry principle" stating that "the
processing can consist of fitting input to expectation" or "finding
structures in which to embed the input" (Bobrow and Norman 1975
140) can be viewed not as an intervention of the central rnechanism
(1975 : 146), but just as a side-effect of the resource allocation
strategy.
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3. SOMĘ PROPERTIĘS OF COG~IrlVE MEMORY
The processor out1ined in the preceding paragraph has an interesting
feature : it processes data according to simple rules but it is very
sensitive to the context of computation, consisting in the physical
configuration of processes. As before, we assume that the way the
configuration changes over time must be governed by some very
primitive rules. The centrifuge metaphor, described be10w, is a first
attempt to approximate the rules searched for.
Let us imagine a centrifuge, preferably with a sphere-like container,
and consider the fluid partic1es to be the analogues of memory
schemata in the spirit of Bobrow and Norman (1975). The surface of
the fluid, characteristically shaped, models the focus of attention.
The centrifugal and gravity forces cause the partic1es to move away
from the surface, some of them even hit the walls of the container;
by analogy, we attribute to the memory schemata the tendency to be
forgotten, realised by physical1y transmitting the information which
constitutes the schemata under consideration to the microprocessors
situated more and more distantly from the focus of attention; these
schemata which "hit the container" are just overriden by some
incoming sensory data (the memory is finite, so every new information
has to erase physically some old one).
Before we explain why everything is not always forgotten, it is
necessary to describe the structure of memory schemata. They consist
in components called slots in artificial intelligence jargon,
containing context-dependent descriptions (Norman, Bobrow 1979). The
descriptions serve two purposes they yield partial' information
about the components, and specify the criteria for recognising, in
the particu1ar context, a possible component instance in the memory.
The components of a schema are usual1y interconnected, and matching a
component description against the schema it refers to results in
propagating to other components the information constituted by the
instantiation, established during the matching operation, of the
variabies in the context dependent description under consideration.
The values received by the variabies consist generally in other
context-dependent descriptions which may in turn contain new
variabies; however, every instantiation of a variable increases the
amount of informat ion stored in the schema. In consequence, we may
compare the number of variable instantiations in differen schemata
and so calI the schemata more or less instantiated.
If a schema is successfully matched against a context-dependent
description, the transmission of information is bidirectional in the
general case : from the instantiating schema to the instantiated one
(Le. the schema to which the instantiated description belongs to)
and vice versa (cf. for example the unification operation in logic
programming). In a special case it may happen that, due main1y to the
complexity of the re1ations between a schema's components, the
instantiation of a description and the propagation of the variable
setting to the other components consists in sophisticated processing
of input information.
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We assume that whenever a schema is in the focus of attention area
(the surface of memory), an attempt is made to instantiate all its
components. The proper queries are sent step by step to more and more
microprocessors; the query transmission, which takes a considerable
amount of time because of the postulated pseudo-physical properties
of the network, has the character of a wave going through the whole
memory (possibly interfering with other such waves initiated by other
components of the schema or other schemata present in the focus
area). To stress these facts we will refer to a query transmission aS
broadcasting.
Whether the schema reaches the surface or not depends on what
priority relative to other responding schema is attributed to it by
the scheduling rules; in any case, the copy of the schema is closer
to the surface than the original schema was; although it is now
subject to the general rules of forgetting , the memory of
information stored in it was refreshed. The centrifuge analogue of
the situation is when a particIe does not hit the container, but is
brought by the undercurrent to the central whirl or to the surface
(if we identify the focus of attention with the consciousness, we
calI the whirl "subconsciousness").
The focus of attention is a region of the memory where an important
amount of processing capacity is concentrated. It is used mainly for
processing schemata on the component level, e.g. transmitting
information between components belonging to one or to several
schemata. in other parts of the memory the processing capacity
available allows only processing of the most prominent components of
a schema; such components may be called headers or clues. Only the
components processed decide whether a schema will respond to a query.
It should be stressed that the focus of attention region includes
also purely sensory schemata (the fluid surface in the centrifuge
borders with the walls of the container, which are intepreted as the
source of the sensory data to be monitored.
As may be expected, we do not postulate different kinds of memory.
The differences in memory operation are attributed to the structure
of individual schemata (semantic memory schemata have different kinds
of components and clues to episodic schemata) or to the distance of
the schemata from the focus of attention (short verSus long term
memory, etc.).
The cognitive system advocated here (the processor and the memory)
shows a very important feature although based on simple
deterministic rules, it can react differently to identical stimuli
because of the ab ility to memorise, again by simple deterministic
rules, the history of previous computations in the form of physical
configuration of the memory schemata. Its enormous possibilities are
most easily demonstrated by recalling the "intelligent" behaviour of
the homeostat (Ashby 1952), which was an automaton of onIy 390, 625
states; if the cognitive system is treated as a black box automaton,
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then its number of states is incomparab1y greater, so we can expect
from it respective1y more sophisticated behaviour. On the other hand,
the cognitive system has many more parameters which can be changed
independent1y than does the homeostat, so the chances of tuning the
system to the desired kind of behaviour are much better.
Of course, the ideas presented do not exp1ain a11 the known
phenomena, but for the time being it is sufficient that, as far as I
know, the centrifuge hypothesis does not contradict any. 1t may a1so
be the case that the fluid partic1es in a centrifuge circu1ate in a
different way than described (I am not an expert in fluid mechanics),
but this wou1d be obvious1y irre1evant to our discussion.
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4. MEMORY SCHEMATA
In this section we will develop further the centrifuge model of
memory by discussing the life cycle of a typical schema.
Depending on the current direction of processing, a physical instance
of a prototype schema is either already present in the focus area, or
the prototype is searched for. In any case the schema we will discuss
is created in the focus area by merging the prototype with the input
data which are to be accounted for; the input may consist in the real
input of sensory data or in some output of other cognitive processes.
Depending on the centrality of the schema position in the focus area,
more or less intensive attempts are made to -instantiate the
context-dependent descriptions contained in the components of the
schema.
It is natural to assume that one of the schema's components points to
the schema 's prototype. Because the attempt is made to instantiate
all the components, it ensures that the prototypes are not forgotten
and that the ones most frequently used are kept close to the focus.
While the queries for the slot instances are broadcasted, the schema
itself is already subject to the tendency of being removed from its
current position to a less central one. A schema which is really
useful for the processing in progress is highly interconnected with
other schemata in the focus, the interconnections actually consisting
in transmitting the information, so that useful schemata should be
relatively more instantiated than the less useful ones. A more fully
instantiated schema demands a more deterministic process~ng; because
the deterministic computations are preferred by the resource
allocation rule, such schema will get the resources requested at the
cost of the less fully instantiated ones. When free storage is needed
in the focus for a new schema, the useful schema will use the
resources to stay in the focus area, but the other schemata will be
removed to the region where they can be maintained with smaller
resource consumption, i.e. outside the focus area. To make place for
them, the schemata residing close to the focus area will be
transmitted to less central positions, etc.
Let us assume that the schema under consideration is a useful one and
has resisted the attempts to remove it from the focus area. In the
meantime some schemata matching the context-dependent descriptions of
its components were found and transmitted toward the focus area.
Those which looked good enough to the resource allocation routine got
their places in the focus area, the others failed and reside more or
less closely to the focus. Additionally, some schemata may be still
in the course of transition toward the focus, and some relevant
schemata may not be reached yet by the broadcast of the inquiries.
The schemata in the focus area instantiated the respective components
of the schema under discussion, Le. the information was exchanged
between the instantiated and instantiating schemata. It may happen
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now that some other schema is more fully instantiated than the one
under discussion, either due to the direction of the information
propagation, or because new input data fit the other schema well
enough. Let us assume then that our schema cannot resist this time
the new attempts to remove it, and becomes forgotten.
In the general case the situation is slightly more complicated. When
the schemata are on the surface, the borders between them practically
do not exist, because the concentration of the processing capacity is
so high that every component gets the resources independently of the
schema to which it belongs. When a new schema arrives at the surface,
room is made for it by looking for the components which are less
useful. When they are found, they are packed together in such a way
that as few links to other schema are cut as possible : usually the
interconnections between the components of a schema are denser than
the interconnection between the components belonging to different
schemata, so the procedure results in reconstructing the schema
brought to the surface • Nevertheless, in the general case a new
schema can be created and subjected to the forgetting process.
The fate of the schema removed from the focus area depends now on two
factors : gravity and centrifugal forces• The gravity force causes
the schemata to drown, Le. to be transmitted to the less active
regions of the memory, where their maintenance consumes less
resources. Economy of resources is gained by processing only the most
prominent components, therefore it may happen that a schema will not
respond to a relevant query merely because it is referred to by the
description of a less prominent component. Actually the gravity force
is a result of the fact that al! the schemata are pusąed down and
down to make place for the schemata removed from the focus area. A
natural assumption is that with growing depths a decreasing number of
components is subject to processing.
On the very bottom of the memory, the processing capacity is so low
that the query cannot be compared even with one component of every
schema, but a component of a schema is to be chasen more or less
randomly for comparison. From the point of view of the query sender,
the schemata totally ignored during the comparison are represented by
the component which happened to be processed. In the general case the
component may be unrelated to the schemata skipped, and such
misrepresented schemata can be brought to the focus area only
accidentally. It might be the case that e.g. the memories of early
childhood which last for years and come to mind quite spontaneously
can be explained just this way.
Let us imagine now that a query was broadcast to which our schema is
relevant. When it arrives at the schema, it is matched against those
components of it, which are subject to processing at the given depth.
If the answer is positive, the schema moves through the undercurrent
towards the surface, 1.e. it is transmitted by recopying, through
channels different from those used for broadcast, to a more and more
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central position. When approaching the surface, the channels become
more and more busy and the schema has to compete with others on a
first come - first served basis. The schemata waiting for channels to
be free are the analogue of the whirl, and their requests for storage
constitute the centrifugal force mentioned above. If a schema is
pushed by its competitors far enough from the whirl, it is not able
to recover its status and become subject again to the gravity and
centrifugal forces.
Transmitting by recopying is subject to various distortions : some
information may be garbled by hardware errors or the transmission
cannot be finished because of lack of resources.
The first case is rather uninteresting, although it can serve as an
explanation of some deformations of our memories. The second case is
a very important one. If we assume that the schema is transmitted
approximately in the top-down order of its internal pointer
structure, then the interrupted transmission may result in a
syntacticalIy correct schema which lacks only some most specific
information from the original one. Under proper circumstances such a
transmission may create a new prototype schema. This fact, together
with the possibility mentioned above of creating new schemata in the
focus area, might constitute the essence of some learning abilities.
When a schema is copied, two eventualities arise. If there is a
pending request for storage, the original instance of the schema is
erased by its more central neighbour. If not, the very instance of
the schema is left on its place and is subject to general rules of
forgetting : it will be drowning and pushed by the centr~fugal force.
At the end the schema will reach the walls of the container, i.e. it
will be erased and the storage space formerly occupied by it will be
used for sensory data to be processed. It should be noted that this
does not mean that the information is completely forgotten, because
some other copies of the schema may still exist.
As can be seen from above, retrieving old information from memory is
very resource consuming. Introducing a new object into memory
consists just in creating a proper context-depending description,
which is a data-limited process requiring a very smalI amount of
resources. On the other hand, making the new object available for
future retrievals consists in relating it to proper cues, which is
again a resource-limited process with heavy demands on processing
power.
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5. saME LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS
We will limit our attention to the problem of understanding natural
language, because it seems to be more basic than language generation.
Passive knowledge of language is always better than active; this is
also true for all the stages of (both first and second) language
acquisition, it is natural to assume that the language universals are
determined mainly by the properties of the understanding process.
Additionally, it is quite probabIe that in careful speech the
generation process is guided by re-analysis of the output.
We take for granted that different aspects of an utterance to be
understood are processed in paralIel. Following Bien (1976) we will
distinguish four main parallel processes (called levels in the
sequel) : sorbtion, syntactics, semantics and assimilation. Sorbtion
consists in the acoustic or optical recognition of utterance
elements. It is a data-limited process and has the highest priority
because of the data assimilation principle. The function of the
second level is relatively close to the traditional notion of syntax:
to recognise the clues consisting e.g. in inf1exional endings and
some other surface phenomena for determining how to assemble the
meanings of the utterance elements (to tell which meanings go
together in the semantic structure of the utterance, it is not
necessary to know what these meanings actually are). For the time
being, we imagine the process of syntactics to resemble that of
Marcus' deterministic parser (Shipman, Marcus 1979). The syntactics
is also a data-limited process, but it should be noted that its
demands for resources may vary relatively much, depending on the'
current stage of the parsing process.
The third level, the semantics, is responsible for two tasks. First,
its job is to construct the complex of memory schemata representing
the meaning of the utterance processed; some of its operations can
perhaps be done in parallel in the style of Smith and Rawson (1976).
Secondly, it should instantiate the proper parts of the semantic
representation schemata with the old information stored in the
memory. Because of the second task the semantic level as a whole is a
resource-limited process; however, the amount of processing actually
performed by it depends strongly on the resource allocation
preference for a deterministic flow of computations.
The fourth level, the assimilation, consists in spontaneous
processing not related directly to the literaI meaning of the
utterance, e.g. inferring the connections between the utterance
meaning and other known facts, which supplies it with useful clues
for future retrievals, but does not belong to the meaning itself. The
assimilation is also a resource-limited process, and its priority is
even lower than that of the semantics, because it is very loosely
related to the sensory data.
AlI the factors minimize the need for resource-consuming
memory; the first one is decisive for temporary skills
easily forgotten, the others enter into consideration
heavily practised and well memorised skilis.
search of
which are
only for
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The input to the syntactic level is of course the output of sorbtion,
the input to the semantic level is the output of the syntactics, etc.
We assume however that al! the processing is done by some memory
schemata, and e.g. the semantics can influence the processing on
other levels by changing the saliency of the relevant schemata.
Both in phylogenesis (the emergence of language in humans) and in
ontogenesis (language acquisition by individuals), it is the spoken
language which appears first. In consequence, the language
understanding mechanisms are developed under the constraint of
real-time processing; we consider the fact to be of crucial
importance for the explanation of the organisational principles of
language processing. The cognitive processor is so adapted to
real-time language understanding that it probably processes written
texts in the same manner, the only difference consisting in
continuous supply of data by the optical perception processes instead
of the acoustic ones (everybody has experienced the situation when
his eyes scan a text while his attention has been drawn away;
although the eye movement can be avoided or minimalised by a special
training in fast reading techniques, which increases the throughput
of the optical processing , the output of recognition is probably
still supplied sequentially).
According to the naive view, language communication is an easy task
for humans. On the other hand, the participants in language
communication are able to perform simultaneously only highly
automated activities like walking or driving etc. (unless the
communication itself is not a stereotyped one). This fact can be
explained by assuming that language understanding req~ires almost
fulI capacity of the cognitive processor, so it interferes with other
activities except those which consume a negligible amount of
resources; in what follows this assumption is called the fulI
capacity principle.
The automatic activities are assumed to be just very economical as
far as resource consumption is concerned, because we expect them to
be characterised by very high saliency of the relevant schemata, an
optimal organisation of information into the schemata, and an
efficient way of referencing the related schemata (by not using the
context-dependency unless necessary).
As a consequence of the assumption that processing of utterances is
done almost on the verge of the processor capacities, we expect that
different subprocesses of the understanding process are alI the time
competing for resources. This solves in a natural way the old problem
of when to stop spontaneous inferences; because of their low priority
relative to other levels of processing, they stop simply when they
exhaust the resources available.
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Another consequence of the fulI capacity principle is the expectation
that often the processing resources happen to be insufficient to
understand an utterance in real-time. We think it is really the case,
as it was noted already by Ziff : "Sometimes some of us understand
some of what is said" (1972). Our claim is that if during the
processing of an utterance, some of demands for resources cannot be
fulfilled, the utterance is found by the hearer to be more or less
awkward. Actually what happens in such a situation is that the
processing is more or less serialised and understanding of the
sentence takes longer time; if the additional amount of time needed
is small relative e.g. to the intersentence gap, the sentence is
understood and the processor is able to catch up the input data at
the cost of e.g. some spontaneous inferences. If the amount of time
necessary to recover from the processor overload is greater, it may
lead to unsolvable conflicts about what should be processed in a
given moment (just one of the competing tasks must then be aborted).
A special case of processing serialisation is where a sentence is
fully ambiguous, i.e. in the given context two interpretations are on
equal rights and processing of both alternatives in parallei would
cause an important overload of the processor. In such a situation the
serialised subprocesses of understanding must be run at relatively
long time intervals and cannot use common internal data; in
consequence, some partial results are to be memorised in a regular
way, and the hearer is conscious that the sentence is ambiguous and
that he is resolving the ambiguity. However, a typical ambiguous
sentence has one interpretation more easily obtainable than the other
ones, and when it is found, the processing of the others is abandoned
by the hearer's cognitive processor without making him ~ware of the
fact. It should be noted that in some cases it is the abandoned
interpretation which is intended, therefore the participants of the
communication act adhere to various rules of "language games", which
allow, among others, confirming the proper understanding of the
speaker's intentions or quick recovery from misunderstandings.
Most of such rules are still to be found; it might e.g. be
interesting to, investigate the polite forms of addressing, asking,
etc. from the point of view of their resource consumption, as it may
happen that their politeness is due to the optimal processing load
distribution in the utterance time spano Independently of this
question, the ironical or even offensive character of using
over-polite forms may be attributed to the fact that they convey
simple meaning in a form requiring heavy resource consumption.
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&. RESaURCE CaNTRaL DEVICES
It is claimed here that every natural language employs various
devices for resource control, which al10ws balancing the demands with
the resources avai1able. We distinguish two types of these devices :
saliency-related and consumption-related.
The saliency-re1ated devices contro1 the resource consumption only
indirectly, by faci1itating the retrieval of information from memory.
They operate by increasing the saliency of the relevant schemata in
the memory, which can be done in two ways : the schemata may be made
more central, or they can be assigned more adequate clues (actua11y,
sa1iency is inf1uenced also by the number of pseudo-physical copies
of the schema in the memory, but this factor is rather
uncontrollable.
The 1inguistic constructs used for the purpose range from rhetorical
questions to who1e passages of texts, recapitu1ating the information
useful for further discussion. Although the control of sa1iency is
rather indirect, it can be quite precise, allowing the hearer not
onIy to find quickly the proper meaning of the utterance, but a1so to
decode allusion and understatement correct1y.
Saliency is a1so and important factor in pronoun resolution; as it is
shown by recent research on English (Grosz 1978, Hobbs 1978, Webber
1978). However, it is rather obvious that in languages with
grammatical gender the natural way to reso1ve a pronoun is to find
first the relevant nominal phrase using the gender value as a simple
means to limit the search (Bien 1976); then either the.referent of
the noun phrase is taken (a typical pronominal reference) or the
phrase is re-evaluated (pronouns of laziness). Therefore we conclude
that memory also stores various partial results of the sentence
analysis, including some elements of its surface structure. Depending
on how carefu1ly the speaker's usage of pronouns takes into account
their saliency of the hearer's memory (it is e.g. known that little
children are rather bad in this respect), reso1ving the
pronominalisations requires more or less time and resources.
The consumption-related control devices are of very different
characters, and are grouped together only for the purpose of the
presentation. As one of the most important control device we will
interpret the fact that "peop1e tend to express given information,
what is already kmown to the listener, before new information, which
is not already known. The tendency appears to be universal. Languages
overwhe1ming1y prefer to place definite noun phrases (given
information) before indefinite noun phrases (new information). In
some instances, the on1y way to indicate that a noun is definite is
to place it before any indefinite noun, or to place it before the
verb and to place any indefinite noun after the verb" (CIark and
Clark 1977 : 548).
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The exp1anation goes as following "Given information" is the
information which is to be retrievedfrom memory. The retrieva1
process takes a re1ative1y important amount of time, because the
queries must reach the re1evant schemata and then the schemata must
be transmitted to the focus of attention. Putting the given
information at the beginning of an utterance a110ws the search to be
initiated ear1y enough, so that the resu1ts may arrive at the focus
area before they are needed. On the other hand, the memory search
consumes a considerab1e amount of resources; because of its 10w
priority it gets on1y the resources not used by the sorbtion and
syntactics. Again, initiating the search as ear1y as possib1e makes
it easier to co11ect the required amount of resources during the time
span between the occurrence of the "given information" and the moment
when it is rea11y necessary for further processing of the utterance.
The other aspect of the given before new princip1e is that the neW
information is usua11y put on the end of the utterance. This is quite
consistent with our model of the cognitive processor. Because every
schema in the focus area, inc1uding those representing new
information, is spontaneous1y instantiated, putting new information
at the end a110ws the resu1ts of the search for given information to
arrive and be integrated into the "new information" schemata • For
examp1e, if "the man" in the sentence be10w
The man bought a book.
means "John Smith", when an attempt is made to instantiate the schema
for "book" , it is a1ready quite specific because it contains
information "bought by John Smith", supplied both by the memory
search and the processing of the preceding part of the utterance; in
this way wrong instantiations are a1ready prevented. The other factor
is that when the utterance is finished, the memory search is probab1y
deprived of most of its resources, which are taken over by the more
deterministic processes bui1ding the fina1 representation of the
utterance meaning during the intersentence gap.
It shou1d be noted that the assumed re1uctance to introduce new
objects exp1ains very well the essence of the 1aziness hypothesis
of Wi1ks (1976) and the coherence princip1e of Bien (1976).
It shou1d a1so be noted that our given before new princip1e is
actua11y more genera1 than the C1ark and C1ark formu1ation our
c1aim is that we put on the very beginning those 1inguistic
constructs which require more resource-1imited processing. Therefore
we are not puzz1ed by the sentences 1ike
A book was bought by the man.
meaning "the thing bought by the man was a book", which require some
amount of inferencing, instead of memory search, to be re1ated
proper1y to its context.
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Another important feature of natura1 1anguage which decreases the
processing load consists in mechanisms allowing the creation of some
reasonable expectations. We consider two properties discussed in the
linguistic 1iterature to be just the examples of such mechanisms :
Sgall's systemic ordering of participants (Sgall et al. 1973) and
Kuno's empathy rules (1976). Sgall claims that every language has a
preferred "neutral" surface order of deep participant (Actor, Object,
••" Adjective of Time, etc.). Although the c1aim at first glance
seems rather strange, it is probably true, and consistent with the
ideas advocated here. Similarly, Kuno's examples showing awkwardness
of changing the point of view in an utterance, can also be naturally
explained in terms of the processor overload caused by the additional
task of adapting the processing to a new point of view.
The most interested control devices are related to the syntactics
level. They can be divided into global principles, which pose some
limitation on possible syntactical constructions, and the local
principles, which operate during sentence understanding. To the first
type belong some equivalents of Yngve's depth hypothesis, and sorne
resource-allocation rules related directly to specific syntactic
constructions. For example, it seems that the main clause top level
components always receive more resources than subordinate clauses. It
explains why the pronoun in the example (suggested by Richard Hudson)
Mary told him John had won
cannot be coreferential with "John": the main clause pronoun is
evaluated immediately, while the schema for "John" becomes available
later. Let us discuss now more subtle examples, used already in (Bien
1976) :
He went to the pool hall after John left his apartment.
The attempt to resolve "he" starts immediately; it should be
remembered that first the proper nominal phrase is looked for. lf
such a phrase is found and it is not coreferential with "John", then
the sentence is properly understood. lf the phrase is corefei"ential
with "John", then that means that two independent attempts are made
to bring the "John's" schema to the focus of attention. The problem
is that both attempts succeed, yielding two copies of the schema
searched; this gives the strong impression that, in the best case,
two different Johns are talked about.
If there is no suitable antecedent phrase for "he", then there is
another kind of problem, because "John" is proces·sed too late to
contribute the relevant information to the top level of the meaning
structure of the main clause; therefore such a usage of the sentence
is incorrect. On the other hand, we can use the cataphoric reference
in the sentence
After he left the apartment, John went to the pool hall.
because "he" belonging to a subordinate clause waits for processing
long enough,due to the smalI amount of resources allocated for
subordinate clause processing.
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The syntactic structure of an utterance mayaiso influence the
semantic processing in a much simp1er way, e.g. it may suggest the
proper environment for the interpretation of noun phrases embedded in
some intensional context (Bien 1976). However, the syntactic control
device of crucial importance for Slavic languages relies on the
fol10wing assumptions. One of the tasks of the syntactics level is to
generate predictions about the part of the utterance yet to be
analysed. Obviously, generating the prediction consumes sorne
resources; the number of predictions varies during the utterance
analysis (if it is too big, the syntactics become blocked by the
resource allocation rule).
Although Marcus-style parsers for Slavic languages are yet to be
written, it may be expected that when the analysis arrives at the
element, which according to the systemic ordering would be expected
later, no reasonable predictions can be generated. The resources
released by the syntactics are then used for memory search in the
case of e.g. definite reading of a nominal phrase, or for some
inferencing, e.g. in the case of emphasis. In this way we can supply
an explanation for the fact noticed by Sgall that the element moved
forward relative to its default position usua1ly receives the
definite reading.
As a separate category of resource control we consider various
phenomena often interpreted as "redundancy". It was already noted by
Wilks (1975) that so called redundancy (Joos 1972, Scriven 1972) is
useful for properly resolving some kinds of ambiguities. We agree
with this observation, but we concieve the essence of the phenomenons
slightly differently. For example, Joos' semantic axiom. No. 1 that
"the best meaning is the least meaning" we assume to be just a
side-effect of the fulI capacity principle: the speaker should supply
the new information in relatively small portions if he wants to be
understood easily.
A good way to facilitate the hearer's task is to allocate a longer
time span by inserting into the utterance some words requiring little
processing, e.g. "redundant" demonstratives. This method is sometimes
used in Slavic languages (Szwedek 1976) to obtain the effect of
definiteness; in languages like English, this was the main method,
which resulted finally in converting the demonstratives into the
definite article. The indefinite article and its rarely used Slavic
equivalents like the numeral "one" resemble rather the category
described earlier, the difference consisting in the fact that the
hints about low resource a1location (to disallow memory search) come
from the lexical meaning instead of from specific syntactic clues.
The above list of resource control .devices is not intended to be
complete. On the contrary, one should expect new control devices to
be discovered in the future. For example, the recent findings of
Rachel Reichman (to appear) concerning the differences in usage of
"the" , "this" and "that" and simple present versus present continuous
tenses may be interpreted as new types of control information. As far
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as spoken language is concerned, it is possible that the elements
stressed are easier to analyse by the sorbtion level because of their
acoustic properties, so the surplus of' the processing capacity is
allocated to the higher levels yielding e.g. the effect of emphasis.
The interaction of various control devices in the same natural
language is yet to be investigated. One can expect sorne kind of
specialisation, e.g. it might be the case that in German the articles
control mainly the memory search, while the relatively free word
order is used to control spontaneous inferences.
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7. CONCLUSIO,N
Although not yet substantiated satisfactorily, the resource contro1
hypothesis opens new perspectives, a110wing us to view a variety of
seeming1y unre1ated linguistic phenomena as the sophisticated
interactions of a few basic factors. In consequence, a genera1,
intuitive1y appea1ing, framework for natura1 1anguage processing is
proposed, within which it is hoped to accomodate in the future a11
we1l established results of 1anguage understanding research.
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